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Product Liability and Innovation: A Canadian Perspective
Bruce A. Thomas, Q.C.*
Lawrence G. Theall**
F ew people will disagree with the proposition that innovation is a key
to economic well-being as we move into the next millennium. We
believe that Americans and Canadians are by nature innovative people.
North America has been a leader in innovation and technology but,
over the past decade, some have become concerned with the question of
whether external factors are suppressing this inherent strength in our
economy.
We met here just five years ago to discuss the aspects of product
liability affecting innovation in the Canada-U.S. context. I spoke on the
question of whether Canada's legal environment inhibited innovation.
A lot has changed in those five years, and I would like once again to
consider this question, in light of the changes we have seen.
Let me begin by defining the two stages to innovation which occur
to me. First, there is the creative/research stage which leads to innova-
tive changes or product improvements. The second stage is implementa-
tion of these innovations in commercial production. A company may
develop an innovative product in Canada or the United States. It will
then have to consider whether it will implement this innovation by sell-
ing the product in either or both of those countries. Many external fac-
tors could inhibit innovation at either stage. These factors become sig-
nificant at the implementation stage since companies can point to
specific cases where they have chosen not to market a product or to
remove it from the market.
I. CANADIAN LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
When I spoke on this subject five years ago I suggested that tech-
nological innovation had not been significantly inhibited by the Cana-
dian legal system and product liability laws. It was my opinion that the
Canadian experience had been different than the American experience,
perhaps as a result of some of the following factors:
1. Differences between Canadian and American social systems and
basic cultural differences;
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2. Procedural differences within the American and Canadian judicial
systems;
3. Differences between our substantive laws relating to damage
awards; and
4. Differences in our respective substantive product liability laws.
While there have been some changes in Canada's legal environment, I
still conclude that it provides a non-hostile environment for innovation.
A. The Social/Cultural Differences
Canadians are generally less aggressive in their use of the civil
justice system. An example from our office comes to mind. We act for
a manufacturer which faced in excess of 2,000 claims involving a par-
ticular product in the United States. In all of Canada, it faced less than
fifty for the same product. Only one of the Canadian cases has gone to
trial. In the same period, over one hundred cases have been tried in the
United States. That company's experience is that Canadian cases settle
earlier, and for much less, while a much higher percentage of Ameri-
can cases go through to a full trial. This does not appear to be an
isolated case. As a rough measure of comparative numbers of product
liability trials, we conducted a computer search of Lexis and a compa-
rable Canadian database. Lexis had 3,184 Federal and State product
liability cases reported during the period from 1992 to 1994. During
this same period, the Canadian database had only seventy cases re-
ported. This represents a factor of forty-five to one. Differences in pop-
ulation, sales, and use could not account for the significantly lower
number of claims. We believe that there is a greater reluctance on the
part of Canadians to make use of our judicial system. This reluctance
may not be attributable solely to a sense of individual responsibility.
Canadians have available to them a network of medical, health, and
social security programs which reduce the need to litigate. We also
have government-sponsored Workers' compensation providing "without
fault" rehabilitation, retraining, and a guarantee of income for people
who suffer work-related injuries.
Accordingly, while perhaps not capable of precise statistical/aca-
demic analysis, we believe that these social/cultural differences be-
tween our two countries have reduced the need for Canadians to use
our civil court system.
B. Procedural Differences
Three key differences in our systems are the judges, juries, and
costs. While jury trials are the norm in the United States, they are the
exception in Canada. Many counselors never exercise their right to re-
quest a jury. Where a jury is requested, the Court may at any stage of
the proceedings dismiss the jury based upon the complexity of the is-
[Vol. 21:313 1995
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sues. Over the past five years, our appellate courts have suggested that
judges should be more reluctant to dismiss a jury, but the number of
jury trials still remains relatively small.
Our judges are, subject to good behaviour, appointed for life;
therefore, they are not subject to the same concerns as those American
judges who must be elected.
There are really two separate but related ways in which costs deter
product liability litigation in Canada. The first relates to the dispropor-
tionality between costs and potential recoveries, along with the question
of who will assume the risk of costs incurred to prosecute a product
liability claim. The second relates to costs sanctions which can be im-
posed upon plaintiffs by the trial judge.
Few cases in Canada result in multi-million dollar judgments or
settlements. Punitive damage awards are of little if any consequence,
and damage awards for pain and suffering are capped at approximately
$250,000 dollars. All cases, except those involving truly catastrophic
losses, are assessed at less. In some Canadian provinces, including the
most populous province of Ontario, lawyers are not yet permitted to
work on a contingency fee basis. They can choose to bill at the end of
the case knowing they will not be paid if the claim is dismissed, and
they can even personally fund the disbursements, but they cannot then
take a percentage of the recovery. Their fees will be limited to the rea-
sonable fees for the services provided. In the vast majority of cases,
contingency fees, even if available, will not cover the costs required to
prosecute a complex product liability claim. In other words, it is often
uneconomic for plaintiffs counsel to take a case to trial. Experienced
trial lawyers know that the cost of preparing and handling a complex
product claim at trial will be disproportionate to the potential recovery.
Against this back drop, those counselors also know that the costs they
do recover, if any, will not justify the risk of funding disbursements and
not being paid at the end of the day. In fact, few lawyers who work for
injured claimants can afford to assume those risks. Most law firms, our
own being one, discourage such "speculative" practice.
As a rule, "costs follow the event" in Canadian courts. This means
that a successful defendant will be entitled to recover "taxable costs"
from the plaintiff. This will usually work out to fifty percent of the
actual legal expenses. Many provinces also have rules which provide
that the defendant will get its costs where it has made an offer to settle
which was equal to or greater than the amount recovered at trial. I can
assure you that plaintiffs and their counsel are influenced by the pros-
pect of cost sanctions.
One substantial change over the past five years has been the enact-
ment of class action legislation in Ontario. The legislation was the re-
sult of an extensive consultation process involving consumer groups and
major industry representatives. While this legislation has increased the
3
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exposure of certain companies to large groups of claims, it has a num-
ber of positive benefits. In cases where there are a number of substan-
tial claims, it can reduce the total legal fees and allow for the claims to
be efficiently managed. In cases where there are a large number of very
small claims, however, the company will be faced with a liability it
may have avoided in the past.
We do not think that class actions will substantially alter the total
liability of companies where the product claims relate to serious or cat-
astrophic injury. In fact, when handled properly, class action suits can
result in a more cost-effective way in which to resolve product liability
claims.
C. Damages
There are two significant areas where Canadian courts assess dam-
ages very differently: the first is non-pecuniary general damages for
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, etc., and the second is
punitive damages.
Traditionally, punitive damages were rarely awarded, and have not
been available in cases of breach of contract. This has begun to change.
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada held that punitive damages
could be awarded in wrongful dismissal cases, but only where the de-
fendant was deserving of punishment because of harsh, vindictive, rep-
rehensible, and malicious conduct.' That same year, an Ontario judge
awarded punitive damages of $10,000 dollars against a bank which had
dismissed the plaintiff.2 On appeal, the Court of Appeal increased the
punitive damages to $50,000 dollars.' Then, in 1994, the Ontario Court
of Appeal upheld a jury verdict awarding a Crown Attorney $800,000
dollars in punitive damages for defamation by the Church of
Scientology and its solicitor.4 While we do not expect to begin seeing
multi-million dollar awards for punitive damages in products liability
cases, we do believe that our courts will make punitive damage awards
in appropriate cases where they find a defendant's conduct to be truly
reprehensible and worthy of punishment.
As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada placed a "cap"
of $100,000 dollars on non-pecuniary general damages in 1978. With
inflation, this limitation has risen to approximately $250,000 dollars in
1995 Canadian currency.
D. Substantive Law
Canada does not impose strict liability, except to the extent that it
1 Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, 58 D.L.R. 193 (S.C.C.) (1989).
2 Ribeiro v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 67 O.R. 385 (Ont. H.C.J.) (1989).
Ribeiro v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 13 O.R. 278 (Ont. C.A.) (1989).
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 18 O.R. 385 (Ont. C.A.) (1994).
[Vol. 21:313 1995
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flows from breach of an express or implied warranty. While some
courts have imposed a "heavy onus" upon product manufacturers, they
have been careful to emphasize that the finding of liability is not based
upon strict liability but upon traditional standards of negligence. In
fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal recently affirmed its commitment to
these principles in a product liability case, Gregorio v. Intrans Corp.5
The trial judge held the Canadian distributor liable for the negligent
manufacture of a product. The Court of Appeal held that the distribu-
tor, even where it is a wholly owned subsidiary of the manufacturer,
cannot be held liable for the negligence, if any, of its parent company.
Mr. Gregorio purchased a truck from Intrans which, in turn, had
ordered the truck from Paccar Canada Ltd. (Paccar), the wholly
owned subsidiary of Paccar Inc., an American truck manufacturer.
When he experienced problems with the vehicle, Mr. Gregorio sued
Intrans and Paccar. The trial judge found the problems with the truck
were not sufficient to establish fundamental breach of the contract, but
he held Intrans liable for breach of implied conditions under the Sale
of Goods Act. The judge found that the defendants could not rely upon
limitations in the written warranty because they were not brought to
Gregorio's attention prior to the contract being signed. The trial judge
held Paccar liable for negligent manufacture of the truck by its parent
company.
The Court of Appeal held that Paccar could not be liable for the
negligence of its parent company, even though it was a wholly owned
subsidiary. The court stated that distributors owe their own duty of
care to the public, but that there was no evidentiary basis for a finding
of negligence against Paccar. It noted that, at best, Gregorio had a
claim against Paccar for breach of express warranty; therefore, Paccar
was not liable to Gregorio.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the finding that Intrans was liable
under the Sale of Goods Act of Ontario, and that Paccar was in turn
liable to Intrans under the Sale of Goods Act since it had not effec-
tively limited the implied conditions under that Act. The important
point to note is that the Court of Appeal imposed liability based strictly
upon the contractual relationships of the parties and the applicable pro-
visions of the Sale of Goods Act.
Contributory negligence is a principle of law to which more than
"lip service" is paid by our judges. The conduct of the plaintiff is care-
fully scrutinized. Accordingly, the expense and uncertainty of a prod-
uct liability claim based upon defective design, combined with the po-
tential for significant contributory negligence, are discouraging factors
and not ones which have curtailed product innovation in Canada.
A more common theory of liability advanced by claimants has
5 Gregorio v. Intrans Corp., 18 O.R. 527 (1994).
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been the failure to warn of the potential for harm. Most cases contain
such a plea against the manufacturer or the distributor. This theory
may be based upon risks known to the manufacturer at the time of
distribution, or problems which are subsequently identified. Our Courts
have imposed a very high burden upon manufacturers to recall, or to
warn consumers, where a defect is found after a product has been sold.
In Buchan v. Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd.,6 a young wo-
man suffered a stroke six months after she began taking an oral contra-
ceptive manufactured by Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd.
(Ortho). The trial judge found that Ortho had breached its duty to
warn both Ms. Buchan and her doctor of the potential risks of taking
the drug.
On appeal, the Court considered the duty to warn and noted that:
[O]nce a duty to warn is recognized, it is manifest that the warn-
ing must be adequate. It should be communicated clearly and under-
standably in a manner calculated to inform the user of the nature of
the risk and the extent of the danger; it should be in terms commensu-
rate with the gravity of the potential hazard, and it should not be
neutralized or negated by collateral efforts on the part of the
manufacturer.7
Ortho argued that it need only warn the doctor, and that the
"learned intermediary" rule should be applied. After observing that
there were few Canadian or British cases dealing with these subjects,
but that the United States had considerable jurisprudence on point, the
Court said: "American jurisprudence dealing with products liability
based on negligence, it may be remembered, is rooted in the same fun-
damental philosophy and is based on the same general principles of
negligence. ... 8 The Court also held that while the learned interme-
diary rule would generally apply to prescription drugs, contraceptives
were an exception to this rule. In the case of contraceptives, the manu-
facturer owes a duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the potential
dangers of using the drug.
The Court reviewed evidence of considerable differences between
the information provided to physicians by Ortho in Canada and by its
U.S. parent company and then held that Ortho had not adequately in-
formed Canadian physicians.
Even though the Court found that Ortho had chosen to aggres-
sively market the drug and minimize any concerns with respect to po-
tential risks, it refused to award punitive damages; however, Robins
also said:
[B]y way of counterclaim, the plaintiff submits that the trial judge
6 Buchan v. Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd., 54 O.kR. 92, 103 (1986).
Id. at 101.
S Id. at 102.
[Vol. 21:313 1995
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erred in failing to award punitive and exemplary damages against
Ortho. While the argument is an interesting one and raises issues that
will one day doubtless require the consideration of this Court, I am
not prepared in the circumstances here to reassess the evidence or in-
terfere with the express finding that this is not a case which, on the
evidence, calls for punitive or exemplary damages.9
In Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd.,10 the Nicholsons purchased a
used riding mower in 1976 at a farm auction. In 1981, their home was
destroyed in a fire caused by the mower. The trial judge found that the
design of the mower was inherently dangerous, and that the manufac-
turer (John Deere), knew or ought to have known of this danger.
The John Deere designs had placed the gas tank in proximity to
the battery. When a user placed the mower's dipstick/cap on top on
the tank, it could bridge a gap between the tank and battery causing a
spark and igniting gasoline vapours. This phenomenon was known as
"arcing." The mower purchased by the Nicholsons had been manufac-
tured in 1967. Between 1973 and 1979, a number of accidents came to
John Deere's attention, all involving arcing "and therefore due in a
general way to the close proximity of the battery to the fuel tank.""1
In 1980, John Deere implemented a program to:
(1) warn users of the risk of fire and explosion due to arcing; and,
(2) distribute a battery-cover safety kit, (the Kit).
In May, 1980, John Deere sent letters to territory managers and
area service managers informing them of the program and asking that
they urge customers to have the Kit installed. When John Deere real-
ized that the program was having a very limited effect, it took the fol-
lowing steps:
(1) placed advertisements in newspapers;
(2) sent unregistered letters to known original users;
(3) sought greater dealer participation; and
(4) began "tagging parts" which were "captive" to the models in
question with a card describing the potential problem. This tagging
initiative was not implemented until April or May, 1981.
The court made the following observations:
Assuming the finding that the design was defective in that it
presented a serious and unnecessary risk of harm to consumers, the
duty of a manufacturer was surely not to manufacture [it] at all if he
knew or ought to have known of it. If the evidence satisfied the court
that there was no knowledge or imputed knowledge at the manufac-
turing stage, there was an acquired duty to correct the defect and/or
o Id. at 121-22.
10 Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd., 58 O.R. 53 (1986).
' Id. at 57.
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to warn consumers once knowledge was gained."2
The court went on to state:
A manufacturer does not have the right to manufacture an inherently
dangerous article when a method exists of manufacturing the same
article without risk of harm. No amount of or degree of specificity or
warning will exonerate him from liability if he does.
At a minimum, however, a manufacturer in this case, assuming
that full knowledge, actual or imputed, of the serious potential risk of
harm reached him only some years after his product was marketed, had
a duty to devise a program that left nothing to chance. The decal on
the tank could not be counted on and neither could the manual. The
newspaper advertisements could not be relied upon to reach but a small
portion of the potential victims. And finally, the battery-cover kit pro-
gram failed dismally to meet the high standard which the circum-
stances called for. All of John Deere's efforts brought home the prob-
lem to a mere fifteen percent of owners. With regard to the decal and
operator's manual, they also lack the specificity required of the warning
which the ever-evolving law of product liability demands of manufac-
turers of dangerous products.' 3 I also add expressly what I earlier im-
plied, namely, that the manufacturer ought to have foreseen and antici-
pated that the kinds of warnings, appearing both on the decal and in
the manual, were not likely to reach a large number of consumers, par-
ticularly those of used units. I hold John Deere liable for negligence in
knowingly manufacturing the unit following a faulty design. Alterna-
tively, the efforts to warn were deficient in that the means chosen were
doomed to failure with respect to the vast majority of users. 4 This case
was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
E. Conclusion on Canadian Environment
While there have been notable changes in Canada's legal environ-
ment over the past five years, we do not believe that there is any inhibi-
tion to product innovation in our country today. We believe, however,
that with the globalization of the market place, particularly with the
implementation of NAFTA, we can no longer look at the Canadian
environment in isolation. That is why joint conferences such as this are
important. It allows us all to understand one another better, and the
problems we will have to work on together.
12 Id. at 56.
', See supra note 6.
" See supra note 10, at 60-61.
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II. THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK
When we take a more global perspective on the question of Cana-
dian innovation we, in Canada, must consider the international legal
environment, particularly in the United States, just as Americans will
want to better understand the positive and negative attributes of the
Canadian legal system.
The insurance crisis during the mid-1980s brought the cost and
availability of product liability insurance to the forefront. Many Cana-
dian companies were unable to obtain insurance for goods being sold
into the United States. We heard that insurers were concerned with the
risk exposures within the American market because of unlimited dam-
ages for pain and suffering, and the punitive damage awards in product
cases. In addition, the joint and several liability issues worked to the
disadvantage of some defendants in certain cases, and these exposures
caused anxiety among Canadian insurers who were asked to take U.S.
risks. But all manufacturers, whether based in the United States, Ca-
nada, Japan, or the European Community, are faced with the same
market conditions. We are not aware of any let up by Canadian com-
panies in their effort to export goods to the United States.
In response to concerns with respect to American liability risks,
many Canadian insurance policies have exclusions for products sold
into the United States. Some manufacturers also choose not to sell
their product in the United States. In these ways, some insurers and
some producers of goods have been able to limit their risks primarily to
Canada. But for the most part, the United States remains a target
market for Canadian companies.
More and more Canadian products are finding their way into the
United States; therefore, more American claims can be expected on
insurance policies which were traditionally "Canadian only risks."
Companies which have chosen to avoid the American market may find
that their product is nevertheless finding its way into the stream of
commerce flowing into the United States. This is not yet an issue in the
Canadian insurance industry, but we believe it will become a serious
concern for underwriters and risk managers over the next few years,
unless the Senate of the American Congress approves a large measure
of the Tort Reform Bill now before it.
For multi-national companies, these changes to globalization of
trade make little difference. To small Canadian manufacturers, they
may represent a significant change in their business plans. They may
find their innovations inhibited at the implementation stage, when they
cannot obtain insurance to cover the risks in the United States.
III. CONCLUSION
We do not believe there is a single simple answer to whether prod-
9
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uct liability inhibits innovation. The answer will change from industry
to industry, and from corporation to corporation. Product liability may
have inhibited the distribution of some new products. Examples sug-
gested by the pharmaceutical industry immediately come to mind. Al-
though large corporations are able to spread the risk and costs of prod-
uct liability over a large volume of sales and income, some American
risks are so substantial that even large multi-nationals do not wish to
accept the exposure. Most businesses attempt to obtain insurance to
cover the risk. In some industries, such as the automotive industry, in-
novation can actually improve product liability exposures while in
others, such as the pharmaceutical industry, innovative new products
can attract debilitating claims.
We do not believe that the American economy has suffered from a
lack of innovation solely due to the product liability laws of the United
States; however, curtailment of monies allocated to research and devel-
opment, toughening consumer expectations, increased government reg-
ulations, and the failure to take the long view, are factors which may
have played a larger role in any curtailment of product innovation in
the United States.
We are convinced that Canadian product liability laws have had
little, if any, impact on Canadian capacity to be innovative. Product
liability laws in Canada at their worst have acted as a safety check to
indifference by product manufacturers and distributors. This is the role
which was intended in Canada and which we are satisfied it fulfills.
We conclude that Canada's legal environment is receptive to inno-
vation. The question for the next five years is whether such an analysis,
made without considering the growing impact of NAFTA, is probative.
We assume that if multi-nationals are inhibited by American trends
and conditions, then there is an impact on innovation in Canada. This
impact may expand to encompass all companies regardless of where
they conduct their research, do business, or sell their product, but there
is precious little evidence of negative impact available today.
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